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ARTICLE  
STATE BANKRUPTCY: SURVIVING A 
TENTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE 
DAVID E. SOLAN*
When it becomes necessary for a state to declare itself bankrupt, in the 
same manner as when it becomes necessary for an individual to do so, 
a fair, open, and avowed bankruptcy is always the measure which is 
both least dishonourable to the debtor, and least hurtful to the 
creditor.1
ABSTRACT
During February 2011 the prospect of creating a state-bankruptcy 
chapter burst into the national conversation.  This debate largely centered 
on the necessity of state bankruptcy as a means of averting state bailouts, 
and leading commentators emphasized the need to tread gingerly on state 
prerogatives under the Tenth Amendment.  The constitutionality of 
bankruptcy for states demands closer scrutiny, given that the Supreme 
Court’s recent Tenth Amendment jurisprudence has evolved toward 
protecting state sovereignty. 
The principles handed down from a pair of cases in the 1930s 
involving the constitutionality of municipal bankruptcy would likely 
support upholding a state-bankruptcy chapter that is carefully drawn to 
respect state sovereignty.  Though highly relevant, these cases are not 
* J.D. 2011, Tulane University Law School; B.A. 2008, cum laude, Bucknell University.  
Special thanks to Professor Adam Feibelman for his helpful advice and suggestions.  Thanks also to 
my friends and family for all their support, and especially to Danielle Solan for her insightful 
comments. 
1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
435 (Edwin Cannan ed., The Univ. of Chi. Press 1976) (6th ed. 1793). 
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dispositive, however, because the legal landscape has changed a great 
deal since the 1930s.  Even a broad state-bankruptcy chapter would be 
constitutional, because recent Tenth Amendment jurisprudence does not 
preserve traditional state functions.  The Court has already upheld many 
similar infringements on state sovereignty, such as the interference with 
state contractual obligations. 
Assuming a state-bankruptcy chapter is constitutional, is it a good 
idea?  The main justification expressed for the creation of a state-
bankruptcy chapter is that it is necessary to avoid a massive federal 
bailout, because states are too big to fail.  This justification concludes 
that the grim logic of bailouts applies to the states because they are 
significantly interconnected with the financial markets. 
INTRODUCTION
The great bank bailouts of 2007 have become the most widely 
detested policy in a generation.  At the time, Hank Paulson, Treasury 
Secretary in the Bush Administration, warned Congress that the failure to 
promptly pass a massive bank bailout would lead to an imminent 
collapse of the financial markets.2  The country’s major financial 
institutions—such as Citigroup, Bank of America, Wells Fargo and 
JPMorgan Chase—were so connected with one another that a failure of 
one could lead to a failure of all.3  In other words, these banks were “too 
big to fail.”4
Unwilling to risk a second Great Depression for the sake of standing 
on principle, members of Congress held their noses and voted to approve 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).5  This $700 billion bailout 
2 See Financial Bailout Package Shifts Focus, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 13, 2008, 8:05 
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/11/13/financial-bailout-package-shifts-focus (“In 
September, Mr. Paulson went to Congress and urgently pressed for authority to spend as much as 
$700 billion to unclog the nation’s financial pipelines by buying up unsellable securities from banks 
and other financial institutions.”). 
3 See Cyrus Sanati, Senator Seeks to Break Up Banks “‘Too Big to Fail’”, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Nov. 6, 2009, 1:08 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/11/06/senator-seeks-to-
break-up-banks-too-big-to-fail/.  The subtext for this debate was that the failure of one major 
financial institution could lead others to fail due to their interconnectedness.  This is implied: 
“Senator Bernard Sanders, the Vermont independent, . . . introduced legislation on Friday that would 
force the Treasury Department to break up all financial institutions whose failure could cause a 
major disruption to the nation’s financial system.  ‘If an institution is too big to fail, it is too big to 
exist,’ according to Mr. Sanders.”  Id.
4 Id.
5 See Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Bank Bailout Is Potent Issue for Fall Elections,
N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/us/politics/11tarp.html (noting that the 
Senate approved the bailout measure with a bipartisan vote of 74 to 25, and the House passed the bill 
263 to 171, after initially rejecting it). 
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package was designed to rescue the banking system from collapse.6  Not 
long after, a wave of outrage spread over the nation, rooted in utter 
disgust that the same malefactors whose risky behavior nearly brought 
the economy crashing down were bailed out, leaving the taxpayers 
holding the bag.7  From this froth of outrage a new political power was 
born.  The Tea Party, a loose federation of citizens incensed by the bank 
bailout, joined forces with conservative candidates to defeat incumbents 
who had voted for TARP.8  This coalition swept the Democrats out of 
power in the 2010 congressional elections, and the new leadership of the 
House of Representatives vowed to end the era of bailouts.9
Although it appeared the era of bailouts had come to an end, the 
financial services industry is not the only sector that is interconnected 
with the broader national economy; concern has grown that some large 
states, such as California and Illinois, teetering on the brink of 
insolvency, are also too big to fail.  A report issued by the Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities, a Washington research group, found that 
states collectively face more than $140 billion in budget deficits in 
2012.10  Even bleaker are the states’ unfunded pension and health-care 
liabilities, which amount to $3.5 trillion.11  Moreover, since the states’ 
debt burdens are interconnected with banking institutions, it is plausible 
that the collapse of a single large state could have damaging 
6 See id.
7 See Jennifer Steinhauer, Beware of Anger, Take Advantage of Anxiety, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
18, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/09/19/weekinreview/19steinhauer.html; Carl Hulse & David M. 
Herszenhorn, Bank Bailout Is Potent Issue for Fall Elections, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2010, 
www.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/us/politics/11tarp.html (“Democrats who voted for the bailout—
which was championed by their own leaders along with President George W. Bush and Senator John 
McCain of Arizona, then the Republican presidential nominee—are now facing attacks from 
Republican challengers on the campaign trail.  Republicans who voted for it are being accused of 
promoting big government and fiscal irresponsibility by Tea Party candidates and other 
conservatives. . . . In Iowa, the Democratic Senate challenger, Roxanne Conlin, said that voters 
resented the government aid to big banks . . . .”). 
8 Cf. Hulse & Herszenhorn, Bank Bailout Is Potent Issue for Fall Elections, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/us/politics/11tarp.html (stating that support for the 
bank bailouts was a factor in both the Republican primaries and the general election). 
9 See David M. Herszenhorn, Boehner Offers G.O.P. for 2010 Version of Change, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/11/01/us/politics/01boehner.html (quoting Speaker 
Boehner as stating “if you are tired of all the bailouts, if you are tired of all the stimulus 
spending, . . . remember what the president said: ‘That’s what elections are for.’”); Kate Zernike, 
Tea Party Gets Early Start on G.O.P. Targets for 2012, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2011, 
www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/us/politics/30teaparty.html. 
10 See Alison Vekshin, State Bankruptcy Weighed by Republicans Blocking Aid,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 21, 2011, 2:18 PM), www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-21/u-s-state-
bankruptcy-weighed-by-house-republicans-blocking-aid.html. 
11 See James Pethokoukis, When States Go Bust, WEEKLY STANDARD (Feb. 14, 2011), 
www.weeklystandard.com/articles/when-states-go-bust_541424.html. 
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repercussions for the national economy.12  The European sovereign debt 
crisis reinforced the concern that a financial contagion can quickly 
spread among interconnected entities.13  If investors lose confidence in a 
state’s ability to pay back its debts, the same pattern of financial 
contagion may occur, leading investors to demand sharply higher interest 
rates to buy the municipal debt of other states.14  This turn of events 
would increase the borrowing costs for states, placing an even greater 
burden on strapped state budgets.15  Against this backdrop, leading 
policymakers have proposed extending bankruptcy protection to states as 
a credible alternative to bailing out indebted states in a moment of 
crisis.16
The principles handed down from a pair of cases from the 1930s—
Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, and United
States v. Bekins—involving the constitutionality of municipal bankruptcy 
would likely support upholding a state-bankruptcy chapter that is 
carefully drawn to respect state sovereignty.  However, the resurgence of 
the Tenth Amendment in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence complicates 
the picture and calls for closer analysis.  Ultimately, even in an era of 
12 But see David Skeel, Give States a Way to Go Bankrupt, WEEKLY STANDARD (Nov. 29, 
2010), www.weeklystandard.com/articles/give-states-way-go-bankrupt_518378.html. 
13 See Steven Erlanger & Rachel Donadio, Beyond Greece, Europe Fears Financial 
Contagion in Italy and Spain, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/07/20/ 
world/europe/20europe.html; Graham Bowley, Christine Hauser & Nelson D. Schwartz, Fear of 
Contagion Rocks Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/business/daily-
stock-market-activity.html; Europe’s Financial Contagion, WASH. POST, www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-srv/special/business/financial-crisis-in-europe/ (last updated Nov. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Europe’s 
Financial Contagion, WASH. POST] (“The European debt crisis has already spread like a virus from 
Greece to Ireland and Portugal, and other countries are now at risk: Spain, and Italy are probable 
candidates for financial problems.  Contagion also has much to do with actual economic links among 
countries.  Researchers have identified financial ties in particular as responsible for the ‘fast and 
furious’ spread of crisis from one country to another.”). 
14 See generally Erlanger & Donadio, Beyond Greece, Europe Fears Financial Contagion in 
Italy and Spain, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/07/20/world/europe/ 
20europe.html; Bowley et al., Fear of Contagion Rocks Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, 
www.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/business/daily-stock-market-activity.html; Europe’s Financial
Contagion, WASH. POST, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/business/financial-crisis-in-
europe/ (last updated Nov. 7, 2011).
15 Erlanger & Donadio, Beyond Greece, Europe Fears Financial Contagion in Italy and 
Spain, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/07/20/world/europe/20europe.html; 
Bowley et al., Fear of Contagion Rocks Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, 
www.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/business/daily-stock-market-activity.html; Europe’s Financial
Contagion, WASH. POST, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/business/financial-crisis-in-
europe/ (last updated Nov. 7, 2011). 
16 See, e.g., Jeb Bush & Newt Gingrich, Op-Ed., Better Off Bankrupt, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 
2011, http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/jan/27/opinion/la-oe-gingrich-bankruptcy-20110127. 
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heightened concern for state sovereignty, a well-drafted state-bankruptcy 
law would likely be found constitutional.17
Part I of this Article will analyze the constitutionality of a state-
bankruptcy chapter by reasoning by analogy to a pair of cases from the 
1930s involving the constitutionality of federal laws extending 
bankruptcy protection to municipalities.  This Part argues that a state-
bankruptcy law that honors the principles handed down by Bekins would 
pass constitutional muster.  Part II will probe the main justification 
expressed for the creation of a state-bankruptcy chapter—that is, it is 
necessary to avoid a massive federal bailout because states, like major 
financial institutions, are too big to fail.  Part III sheds light on the impact 
of this Tenth Amendment analysis on drafting considerations. 
17 This Article fits within the literature discussing particular constitutional issues raised by 
bankruptcy legislation.  While many scholars have discussed the constitutionality of particular 
aspects of the bankruptcy system, few have comprehensively explored the constitutionality of 
bankruptcy at great length. See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy Procedure and State-Created Rights: 
The Lessons of Gibbons and Marathon, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 25 (1983); Ralph Brubaker, On the 
Nature of Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A General Statutory and Constitutional Theory, 41 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 743, 862-77 (2000); Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Issues Posed in the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 571 
(2005); S. Elizabeth Gibson, Jury Trials in Bankruptcy: Obeying the Commands of Article III and 
the Seventh Amendment, 72 MINN. L. REV. 967 (1988); Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: 
Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605 (2008) [hereinafter 
Lipson, Debt and Democracy] (developing a comprehensive theory of bankruptcy’s role in the 
constitutional order); Jonathan C. Lipson, Fighting Fiction with Fiction—The New Federalism in (a 
Tobacco Company) Bankruptcy, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1271, 1291-1339 (2000) [hereinafter Lipson, 
Fighting Fiction]; Jonathan C. Lipson, First Principles and Fair Consideration: The Developing 
Clash Between the First Amendment and the Constructive Fraudulent Conveyance Laws, 52 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 247, 272-303 (1997); Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, 71 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1063, 1076-89 (2002); Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN.
L. REV. 487 (1996); James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors’ Rights in 
Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy 
Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973 (1983).  But see Lipson, Debt and Democracy, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. at 616 n.38.  This Article is limited to discussing the Tenth Amendment issues raised by the 
creation of a state-bankruptcy chapter, a discussion that focuses on state sovereignty.  Although a 
related topic, sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment presents interesting challenges for 
a state-bankruptcy chapter, it is outside the scope of this Article.  Many articles have discussed how 
developments in sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment impact bankruptcy.  See, e.g.,
Adam Feibelman, Federal Bankruptcy Law and State Sovereign Immunity, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1381 
(2003); Scott Fruehwald, The Supreme Court’s Confusing State Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence,
56 DRAKE L. REV. 253 (2008); Joseph Pace, Bankruptcy As Constitutional Property: Using 
Statutory Entitlement Theory to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 119 YALE L.J. 1568 (2010); 
Martin H. Redish & Daniel M. Greenfield, Bankruptcy, Sovereign Immunity and the Dilemma of 
Principled Decision Making: The Curious Case of Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 15 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 13 (2007). 
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I.  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATE-BANKRUPTCY CHAPTER
Proponents of a state-bankruptcy chapter tend to assume its 
constitutionality; however, they often suggest that it must be narrowly 
drafted to uphold state sovereignty, “the Constitution’s protections 
against federal meddling in state affairs.”18  In Give States a Way to Go 
Bankrupt, Professor David Skeel argued that the “constitutionality of 
bankruptcy-for-states is beyond serious dispute.”19  At the same time, he 
cautioned that a state-bankruptcy chapter must “tread[] gingerly on state 
prerogatives” for it to be constitutional.20  One cannot have it both ways, 
however: if a state-bankruptcy chapter is easily constitutional, then 
Congress has the liberty to draft a broad bankruptcy chapter.  On the 
other hand, if a state-bankruptcy chapter is constitutionally questionable, 
then Congress’s drafting choices are constrained, such that a bankruptcy 
chapter must be narrowly drawn to avoid violating state sovereignty.21
This paradox calls for further explanation to parse out the constitutional 
problems raised by the creation of a state-bankruptcy chapter. 
A.  CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to make “uniform 
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”22
Remarkably, the introduction of the Bankruptcy Clause near the end of 
the Constitutional Convention elicited little debate.23  The only recorded 
comments were those expressed by Governor Morris, who stated, “this 
[is] an extensive [and] delicate subject.”24 The Federalist Papers are 
equally terse, stating only that the bankruptcy power is so intimately 
18 David Skeel, Give States a Way to Go Bankrupt, WEEKLY STANDARD (Nov. 9, 2010), 
www.weeklystandard.com/articles/give-states-way-go-bankrupt_518378.html. 
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
23 See Lipson, Debt and Democracy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 625 (2008) (stating that 
“[l]ittle is known” about the legislative history of the bankruptcy clause).  On August 29, 1787, 
Pinckney proposed that Congress be given the power “[t]o establish uniform laws upon the subject 
of bankruptcies, and respecting the damages arising on the protest of foreign bills of exchange.”  See
2 MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 447 (1911), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwfr.html. 
24 See FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION at 489.  This Article was written 
in response to Sherman, who objected to granting Congress the power to punish bankrupts by death, 
as occasionally was the case under the laws of England.  No further debate was recorded, and the 
Bankruptcy Clause was adopted by a 9-1 margin.  Id.; see generally Charles Jordan Tabb, The 
History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 12–13 (1995) 
(recounting the discussion of bankruptcy during the Constitutional Convention). 
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connected with the regulation of commerce “that the expediency of it 
seems not likely to be drawn in question.”25  Notably, while ratifying the 
Constitution, the New York Convention proposed an amendment that 
would restrict the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause to merchants and 
traders.26  The rejection of this amendment, however, suggests that the 
framers intended the bankruptcy power to extend beyond merchants.27
The early judicial decisions recognized a broad conception of the 
bankruptcy power.  As early as 1819, Chief Justice Marshall held in 
Sturges v. Crowninshield that Congress has broad discretion to define the 
scope of the bankruptcy power, and interpreted this power as extending 
to the broader realm of insolvency legislation.28  Although “[a]lmost 
every [expansion of the bankruptcy power] has been hotly denounced in 
its beginnings as a usurpation of power,” these objections have receded 
over time.29 an
expanding concept” leaving in its wake a “t
Indeed, the history of the bankruptcy power shows “
rail . . . strewn with a host of 
unsuccessful objections based on constitutional grounds against the 
enactment of various provisions, all of which are now regarded as 
25 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_42.html. 
26 See 1 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 330 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwed.html (“That the power of Congress to pass uniform laws 
concerning bankruptcy shall only extend to merchants and other traders; and the states, respectively, 
may pass laws for the relief of other insolvent debtors.”). 
27 Id.
28 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 195 (1819) (opinion of Marshall, C.J.).  
Justice Marshall also observed that the bankruptcy power is “one on which the Legislature may 
exercise an extensive discretion.” Id.  Contemporary scholars support this sweeping interpretation of 
the bankruptcy power.  See Lipson, Debt and Democracy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. at 633 n.1135 
(citing Frank R. Kennedy, Bankruptcy and the Constitution, in BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY: THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW 131, 137-38 (1988) (“When the variety of the provisions 
enacted by Congress and the frequency and range of attacks on their constitutionality are considered, 
it must be concluded that the courts have indeed come close to permitting Congress complete 
freedom in formulating and enacting bankruptcy legislation.”)). 
29 Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 535 (1936) 
(Cardozo, J., dissenting); id. at 536 n.6 (“‘Thus, it was at first contended that, constitutionally, such a 
law must be confined to the lines of the English statute; next, that it could not discharge prior 
contracts; next, that a purely voluntary law would be nonuniform and therefore unconstitutional; 
next, that any voluntary bankruptcy was unconstitutional; next, that there could be no discharge of 
debts of any class except traders; next, that a bankruptcy law could not apply to corporations; next, 
that allowance of State exemptions of property would make a bankruptcy law non-uniform; next, 
that any composition was unconstitutional; next, that there could be no composition without an 
adjudication in bankruptcy; next, that there could be no sale of mortgaged property free from the 
mortgage.  All these objections, so hotly and frequently asserted from period to period, were 
overcome either by public opinion or by the Court.’” (quoting CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN 
UNITED STATES HISTORY 9-10 (1935))). 
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perfectly orthodox features of a bankruptcy law.” Moreover, n30 early all 
of these bold expansions have received judicial approval as falling within 
the scope of the powers granted by the Bankruptcy Clause of the 
Constitution.31  The only momentary hitch in the road to continuous 
expansion occurred in 1936, when the Supreme Court struck down the 
Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1934 in Ashton v. Cameron County Water 
Improvement Dist. No. 1.32  However, this decision was effectively 
overturned only two years later in United States v. Bekins.33  For over 
seventy years since the Bekins decision, the constitutionality of a 
municipal-bankruptcy law has been well settled. 
History shows that the Bankruptcy Clause extends to any debtors 
that are unable to meet their obligations.34  Given the similarities 
between municipalities and states,35 expanding bankruptcy relief to the 
states could be the next stage in the evolution of bankruptcy.  In this 
sense, the Bankruptcy Clause has proven its flexibility in stretching to 
meet fresh challenges brought by the remarkable growth of American 
business activities.  For example, it has not stood in the way of the 
country’s transformation from an agrarian economy to an industrial 
one.36  Although many expansions of the Bankruptcy Clause were bold 
and far-reaching,37 the courts have held that these expansions were 
within the limits of congressional power.38  These decisions reflect the 
Bankruptcy Clause’s boundless potential to extend into new fields. 
30 See id. at 535. 
31 See, e.g., Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 186 (1902) (upholding the 1800 
Act’s extension of the bankruptcy power beyond traders, and stating that the Bankruptcy Power 
“extends to all cases where the law causes to be distributed, the property of the debtor among his 
creditors; this is its least limit.” (quoting In re Klein, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 277, 281 (1843)); Cont’l Ill. 
Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 670 (1935) (“The 
first [bankruptcy act, in 1800,] ignored the English law, which was confined to traders, as to include 
bankers, brokers and underwriters as well.  The act of 1841 added merchants; and other additions 
have been made by later acts until now practically all classes of persons and corporations are 
included.”).
32 See Ashton, 298 U.S. at 530. 
33 United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 49-50 (1938). 
34 See Hanover, 186 U.S. at 185; Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank, 294 U.S. at 662, 663 n.4. 
35 See Carol F. Lee, The Federal Courts and the Status of Municipalities: A Conceptual 
Challenge, 62 B.U. L. REV. 1, 56-57 (1982). 
36 See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 11-12 (1995). 
37 See id. at 44-45 (recounting the major expansions of the bankruptcy clause over the years); 
id. at 46 (“Today, virtually any law that readjusts the respective rights between creditors and a 
financially distressed debtor falls within the ‘subject of bankruptcies.”). 
38 See Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank, 294 U.S. at 670 (“The fundamental and radically progressive 
nature of these extensions becomes apparent upon their mere statement; but all have been judicially 
approved or accepted as falling within the power conferred by the bankruptcy clause of the 
Constitution.”).
8
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The text of the Bankruptcy Clause does not limit the class of debtors 
that are subject to the bankruptcy power under strict constructionism.39
Indeed, courts have held that Congress’s power under the Bankruptcy 
Clause is “unrestricted and paramount.”40  The only existing limitation is 
that bankruptcy laws passed by Congress must be “uniform”; bankruptcy 
laws should “not be designed to help one debtor in a manner different 
from how other debtors are treated.”41
Similarly, the Supreme Court does not require the exclusion of 
public debtors.  On the contrary, the Court has determined that the 
Bankruptcy Clause extends to all categories of debtors unable to meet 
their obligations.42  In 1902, the Court endorsed the view that “[t]here is 
nothing in the nature or reason of such laws to prevent their being 
applied to any other class of unfortunate and meritorious debtors.”43
This example comports with other authority from the same period that 
reaffirmed the broad scope of the bankruptcy powers.44  In sum, it 
appears that the bankruptcy power extends to all debtors, regardless of 
whether the debtor is an individual or an organization. 
39 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 286 (3d ed. 2006).  Interestingly, when 
it comes to methods of interpreting the bankruptcy clause, the Court has, in the past, appeared to 
embrace a hybrid of the “living Constitution” view and the strict constructionist view. See Cont’l Ill. 
Nat’l Bank, 294 U.S. at 668.  In 1935, the Court remarked that the framers did not intend the powers 
of Congress under the Bankruptcy Clause to be limited to the English or Colonial law in force when 
the Constitution was adopted. Id.  In other words, the framers intended the Bankruptcy Clause to 
expand over time to meet new commercial realities. 
40 See, e.g., In re Delta Group, 300 B.R. 918, 921 (E.D. Wis. 2003), appeal dismissed, 336 
B.R. 405 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929)). 
41 See CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 286 (“For example, in the Regional 
Railroad Reorganization Act Cases, the Court upheld a bankruptcy law that treated railroads in one 
part of the country differently than other areas . . . . The Court explained that the law was ‘uniform’ 
because all of the railroads covered by the law, and all of the creditors of these railroads were treated 
the same under the Act.”). 
42 See Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank, 294 U.S. at 670 (approving a formulation that the bankruptcy 
power extends to “‘any person’s general inability to pay his debts.’” (quoting Kunzler v. Kohaus, 5 
Hill 317, 321 (N.Y. 1843))). 
43 See Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 185 (1902) (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1st ed. 1833); see also Sturges v. 
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 195 (1819) (opinion of Marshall, C.J.) (“[I]t is not easy to 
say, who must be excluded from, or may be included within, this description. It is, like every other 
part of the subject, one upon which the legislature may exercise an extensive discretion.”). 
44 See In re Klein, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 277, 281 (1843) (“To what limits is [bankruptcy] 
jurisdiction restricted? I hold it extends to all cases where the law causes to be distributed the 
property of the debtor among his creditors: this is its least limit.”); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank 
v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 588 n.18 (1935) (same, quoting In re Klein, 42 U.S. at 281); Cont’l Ill. 
Nat’l Bank, 294 U.S. at 672-73. 
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B.  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY—EARLY CASES
The constitutionality of extending bankruptcy protection to 
municipalities was hotly contested in a pair of Supreme Court cases 
during the 1930s.45  These early cases are important to the discussion of 
whether a state-bankruptcy chapter would be constitutional because they 
implicate the same set of issues—state sovereignty and federal power 
under the Bankruptcy Clause.  Although under reigning jurisprudence it 
is well settled that the municipal-bankruptcy law is constitutional, it is 
possible that a state-bankruptcy chapter could be stricken down as an 
impermissible infringement upon state sovereignty.  Such a law would be 
struck down if the sovereignty concerns relating to state bankruptcy were 
different and more pressing than those relating to municipal bankruptcy.  
While cities and states are separate governmental entities, the Court’s 
analysis of municipal bankruptcy has been premised on the status of 
municipalities as agents of the state.46  As the states’ agents, 
municipalities act on their behalf and are subject to their control while 
carrying out local governmental responsibilities.47  The states’ plenary 
power over municipalities is also expressed in the metaphor that 
municipalities are “creatures of the state,” and are thus separate entities 
that owe their existence to the state.48  Under either metaphor, federal 
interference with a municipality constitutes interference with the state 
itself.  While state bankruptcy would apply more directly to the state, 
analogous protections may satisfy the same sovereignty concerns. 
1. Ashton Decision 
Ashton was handed down in an economic climate not very different 
from that of modern America.  The Great Depression ravaged the 
balance sheets of municipalities across the country.  In 1934, 
congressional hearings revealed that 2,019 municipalities, counties, and 
45 In Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, the Court struck down the 
Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1934 and held that extending the bankruptcy power to municipalities 
violated state sovereignty.  298 U.S. 513, 531-32 (1936).  In the second case, United States v. 
Bekins, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a similar law, while declining to overrule Ashton.
304 U.S. 27, 45, 50-51 (1938) (noting that the question on appeal concerned the constitutionality of 
“the Act of August 16, 1937, amending the Bankruptcy Act by adding Chapter 10 providing for the 
composition of indebtedness of the taxing agencies or instrumentalities therein described.” (citation 
omitted)). 
46 See Bekins, 304 U.S. at 54 (describing a municipality as the state’s agency). 
47 See Carol F. Lee, The Federal Courts and the Status of Municipalities: A Conceptual 
Challenge, 62 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1982). 
48 Id.
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other governmental units were in default.49  These municipalities could 
not turn to their respective states for relief, because the Contracts Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the states from passing laws that impair 
the obligation of existing contracts.50  Unwilling to ignore the plight of 
municipalities, Congress passed the Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1934 
(MBA), which provided a mechanism for the discharge of municipal 
debt.51 Well aware of the constitutional problems raised by permitting a 
federal court to exercise jurisdiction over an instrumentality of a state, 
Congress took care to draft the law to minimize infringements of state 
sovereignty, for example, by requiring a municipality to obtain state 
consent prior to being able to utilize the Act.52
Despite such protections, within two years, the Supreme Court, in 
Ashton, found the MBA unconstitutional.53  In that case, an insolvent 
water district, organized under the laws of Texas in 1914, sought to 
adjust its debt obligations under the MBA.54  A minority of the district’s 
bondholders, however, refused to go along with the plan and challenged 
the validity of the petition.55  The trial court held that Congress 
overstepped its power when it authorized a federal court to adjust debt 
obligations of an instrumentality of a state.56  The circuit court reversed, 
holding that Congress had properly exercised the bankruptcy power by 
extending bankruptcy protection to municipalities.57  The Supreme Court 
held that the MBA unconstitutionally interfered with state sovereignty.58
The Ashton Court reasoned that the power of Congress to enact 
uniform laws on bankruptcies did not extend to the political subdivisions 
of states, because such an extension unduly interfered with their fiscal 
autonomy.59  To support its analysis, the Court drew a parallel to the 
taxing power of Congress.60 The Bankruptcy Clause, like the power to 
lay and collect taxes, is “impliedly limited by the necessity of preserving 
49 See Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1868 
and H.R. 5950, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary 
on H.R. 1670, etc., 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). 
50 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.; see Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 128 
(1819) (holding that a state insolvency act could not relieve obligations incurred by the debtor before 
its passage). 
51 See Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 523 (1936). 
52 See S. REP. NO. 407, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1934). 
53 See Ashton, 298 U.S. at 530. 
54 Id. at 523. 
55 Id. at 523-24. 
56 Id. at 524. 
57 Id.
58 Id. at 530. 
59 Id. at 530-31. 
60 Id. at 530. 
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independence of the states.”61  Likewise, the Court emphasized the 
importance of state sovereignty in the federal system, observing that 
“[t]he sovereignty of the state essential to its proper functioning under 
the Federal Constitution cannot be surrendered [or] taken away by any 
form of legislation.”62  The Court characterized the chief purpose of all 
bankruptcy legislation as interfering with the contractual relations of the 
parties by modifying the obligations of their contracts.63  This purpose, 
the Court observed, could not be applied to states or to their political 
subdivisions.
Notably, the specter of extending the Bankruptcy Clause to 
sovereign states was in the forefront of the Court’s mind.64  For example, 
the Court asked rhetorically, “If federal bankruptcy laws can be extended 
to respondent, why not to the state?”65  The Court was apparently 
concerned with the slippery slope leading to bankruptcy for states, and it 
decided to thwart such expansion.66  Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
struck down the MBA as unconstitutional because it could “materially 
restrict [the water district’s] control over its fiscal affairs.”67
In his dissent, Justice Cardozo characterized the issue in narrow 
terms: “Is there power in the Congress under the Constitution of the 
United States to permit local governmental units generally, and irrigation 
or water improvement districts in particular, to become voluntary 
bankrupts with the consent of their respective states?”68 Cardozo started 
61 Id.
62 Id. at 531 (stating that it is impermissible for the federal government to “pass laws 
inconsistent with the idea of sovereignty”).  “If obligations of states or their political subdivisions 
may be subjected to the interference here attempted, they are no longer free to manage their own 
affairs; the will of Congress prevails over them . . . . And really the sovereignty of the state, so often 
declared necessary to the federal system, does not exist.”  Id. 
63 Id. at 530. 
64 Id. at 532. (Cardozo, J., dissenting).  Notably, Justice Cardozo, in dissent, also suggested 
that he would view the extension of bankruptcy to states to be unconstitutional.  Id. at 542 (“There is 
room at least for argument that within the meaning of the Constitution the bankruptcy concept does 
not embrace the states themselves.”).  Cardozo reasoned that under the U.S. public laws, “a state is a 
sovereign or at least a quasi sovereign.”  Id.  “Not so a local governmental unit, though the state may 
have invested it with governmental power.”  Id. at 541.  As an example of an attribute of sovereignty 
that resides with states, Cardozo listed immunity from suit, which “belongs to the state alone by 
virtue of its sovereignty.”  Id. at 543 (citing Hopkins v. Clemson Agric. Coll., 221 U.S. 636, 645 
(1911)).  In other words, since states are considered sovereign, extending the bankruptcy power to 
them inherently interferes with their sovereignty. 
65 Id. at 530 (majority opinion). 
66 Id. (“If the state were proceeding under a statute like the present one, with terms broad 
enough to include her, apparently the problem would not be materially different. Our special concern 
is with the existence of the power claimed—not merely the immediate outcome of what has already 
been attempted.”). 
67 Id.
68 Id. at 532 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
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his analysis by tracing the history of the bankruptcy power, noting that 
although it has steadily expanded over the years, “[a]lmost every change 
has been hotly denounced in its beginnings as a usurpation of power.”69
Cardozo stated that the MBA was carefully drafted to avoid interfering 
with state sovereignty, and he conceded for the sake of argument that a 
more sweeping law might upset the balance between state and federal 
power.70 He emphasized that the MBA did not provide for involuntary 
bankruptcy; therefore, the critical element of consent was preserved, 
which prevented the MBA from upsetting the balance of power between 
the federal government and the states.71  It thus appears that Cardozo 
would have drawn the constitutional line at involuntary bankruptcy, 
because such a law would lack the critical element of state consent; in 
Cardozo’s view, municipal bankruptcy would be constitutional so long as 
it takes place in a voluntary proceeding.72
Importantly, Cardozo emphasized the practical necessity for the 
MBA.73  Forbidding municipalities from entering into voluntary 
bankruptcy would mean they are “caught in a vise from which it is 
impossible to let them out.”74  Since the Contracts Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution forbids states from offering a forum to rework contracts,75
the states themselves cannot directly rescue their municipalities from 
financial ruin.  In the absence of federal bankruptcy protection, the 
collective action problem dictates that “a small minority of creditors . . . 
will resist a [fair and reasonable] composition.”76  Therefore, a 
municipal-bankruptcy chapter becomes necessary as a practical matter 
for some indebted municipalities to become solvent. 
69 Id. at 535. 
70 Id. at 538 (“The question is not here whether the statute would be valid if it made 
provision for involuntary bankruptcy, dispensing with the consent of the state and with that of the 
bankrupt subdivision.  For present purposes one may assume that there would be in such conditions 
a dislocation of that balance between the powers of the states and the powers of the central 
government which is essential to our federal system.”). 
71 Id. at 541. 
72 Id. at 541-42. 
73 Id. (“To hold that this purpose must be thwarted by the courts because of a supposed 
affront to the dignity of a state, though the state disclaims the affront and is doing all it can to keep 
the law alive, is to make dignity a doubtful blessing.  Not by arguments so divorced from the 
realities of life has the bankruptcy power been brought to the present state of its development during 
the century and a half of our national existence.”). 
74 Id.
75 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.; see generally J. Michael Veron, The Contracts Clause 
and the Court: A View of Precedent and Practice in Constitutional Adjudication, 54 TUL. L. REV.
117 (1979). 
76 Ashton, 298 U.S. at 541 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
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2. Bekins Decision
Congress responded to the Ashton Court’s decision by amending the 
MBA in 1937.77  The revision provided for a composition procedure 
similar to an agreement between a debtor and a majority of creditors, and 
it required the approval of a majority of creditors before a municipality 
could obtain a discharge of its debts.78  In recognition of state 
sovereignty concerns, bankruptcy judges were given a passive role in the 
bankruptcy process, limited to determining whether an agreement was 
fair.79  Notwithstanding minor drafting changes, the new law 
accomplished the same objective that the Court had firmly rejected in 
Ashton, namely the extension of the bankruptcy power to 
municipalities.80
In Bekins, however, the Court retreated from its earlier position that 
state sovereignty presents a barrier to extending bankruptcy to 
municipalities.  Bekins considered “the question of the constitutional
validity of the [1937 Act], amending the Bankruptcy Act by adding 
chapter [X] providing for the composition of indebtedness of the taxing 
agencies or instrumentalities.”81  The Court held that the 1937 Act was 
constitutional, finding that the voluntary composition of debts “was 
nothing less than ‘the subject of the relations between an insolvent or 
non-paying or fraudulent debtor, and his creditors, extending to his and 
their relief.’”82  The Court reasoned that “[t]he statute is carefully drawn 
77 See Act of Aug. 16, 1937, §§ 81-84, 50 Stat. 653 (1937), available at HeinOnline. 11 
U.S.C. §§ 401-404. 
78 See Giles J. Patterson, Municipal Debt Adjustment Under the Bankruptcy Act, 90 U. PA. L.
REV. 520, 525 (1942) (“The Supreme Court of the United States not only had defined compositions, 
but it had enumerated the essential characteristics of them.  A composition, it had said, was in the 
nature of a contract or agreement between the debtor and a majority of its creditors.  In a proceeding 
for composition, the Court is limited to a determination of the fairness of that agreement; but for this 
it would not be necessary for the debtor to seek the intervention of the Court.”). 
79 See id.
80 See Daniel J. Goldberg, Municipal Bankruptcy: The Need for an Expanded Chapter IX, 10 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 91, 94 (1977) (describing the revision as “virtually identical to its 
predecessor”); David L. Dubrow, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Viable Option for 
Municipalities in Fiscal Crisis?, 24 URB. LAW. 539, 550 (1992) (describing the revision as a 
“slightly modified version”). 
81 United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 45 (1938). 
82 Id. at 47 (citing Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. 
Co., 294 U.S. 648, 673 (1935)).  Echoing Cardozo’s dissent in Ashton, the majority of the Court 
emphasized the practical necessity of extending bankruptcy to municipalities.  Id. at 54 (“We see no 
ground for the conclusion that the Federal Constitution, in the interest of state sovereignty, has 
reduced both sovereigns to helplessness in such a case.”).  The Court stressed that states are obliged 
to cooperate with the federal government because a “[s]tate itself is powerless to rescue” its 
municipalities from financial ruin due to the Contracts Clause.  Id.
14
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so as not to impinge upon the sovereignty of the State.”83  Congress had 
adequately responded to the concerns raised in Ashton by allowing the 
state to keep control of its fiscal affairs, and by authorizing the exercise 
of the bankruptcy power only when the state consents.84
Whereas the Ashton Court envisioned a rigid federal system in 
which the powers of Congress cannot reach into spheres traditionally left 
to the states, even with the states’ consent,85 the Bekins Court concluded 
that “[i]t is of the essence of sovereignty to be able to make contracts and 
give consents bearing upon the exertion of governmental power.”86  This 
logic suggests that a municipal-bankruptcy chapter is consistent with 
federalism norms so long as states consent for their municipalities to 
participate.  Furthermore, “the Tenth Amendment protected, and did not 
destroy, [a state’s] right to make contracts and give consents” to limit the 
exercise of its powers.87  The Court went on to draw an analogy to the 
making of treaties, where “governments yield their freedom of action in 
particular matters in order to gain the benefits which accrue from 
international accord.”88
The Ashton decision “came at the twilight of the traditional 
framework and the dual spheres model of federalism.”89  It reflected the 
Court’s shift away from a rigid construction of state sovereignty under 
the Tenth Amendment, where there is a well-defined sphere of exclusive 
state dominance,  and toward the more flexible, modern approach.  
Under the former approach, a state-bankruptcy chapter would likely 
intrude into the separate sphere reserved for the states by the Tenth 
Amendment; under the latter approach, so long as a state consents to 
participate in the federal bankruptcy process, 
90
“[t]he State acts in aid, and 
not in derogation, of its sovereign powers.”91
83 Id. at 51. 
84 Id. at 50-51 (“In enacting chapter 10 the Congress was especially solicitous to afford no 
ground for [the Ashton Court’s] objection.”). 
85 See Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936) 
(“Neither consent nor submission by the states can enlarge the powers of Congress . . . . The 
sovereignty of the state essential to its proper functioning under the Federal Constitution cannot be 
surrendered; it cannot be taken away by any form of legislation.”).
86 Bekins, 304 U.S. at 51-52. 
87 Id. at 52. 
88 Id.
89 See Carol F. Lee, The Federal Courts and the Status of Municipalities: A Conceptual 
Challenge, 62 B.U. L. REV. 1, 21 n.94 (1982). 
90 Id. at 6-7. 
91 Bekins, 304 U.S. at 52. 
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3. Applying Ashton and Bekins to State Bankruptcy 
The Court’s shift from Ashton to Bekins was dramatic.  In Ashton,
the Court issued a sweeping holding that struck down the Municipal 
Bankruptcy Act on the grounds of protecting state sovereignty.92  Only 
two years later, in Bekins, the Court abruptly changed course and largely 
adopted Justice Cardozo’s dissenting opinion in Ashton by emphasizing 
that federalism concerns are alleviated when the state gives its consent 
for municipalities to participate in the bankruptcy process.93
Similarly, the inherent federalism conflict present with municipal 
bankruptcy would occur with state bankruptcy.  In the context of 
municipal insolvency, the federalism conflict emanates from the fact that 
while states wield plenary power over their municipal subdivisions, the 
federal government is charged with promulgating a uniform system of 
bankruptcy.94  As a result, the Court’s discussion in Ashton and Bekins
regarding how federalism principles apply to municipal bankruptcy sheds 
light on the application of federalism principles to state bankruptcy.95
Although the portions of the two opinions discussing the constitutionality 
of extending bankruptcy protection to states are dicta, the Court’s 
analysis of state sovereignty, though not binding on future courts, is 
instructive and should not be ignored. 
The Bekins Court articulated a more flexible theory of state 
sovereignty than the rigid formalism expressed in Ashton.  Had the 
Bekins Court adopted Justice Cardozo’s reasoning that a local 
governmental unit is neither a sovereign nor a quasi-sovereign, the 
constitutionality of a state-bankruptcy chapter would be thrust into 
greater doubt, because such a distinction broadens the conceptual 
distance between municipalities and states.96  Instead, the Bekins Court 
grounded its reasoning in the idea that state consent can override 
federalism concerns.  For example, the Court noted that a state, like a 
country that enters into a treaty, has the power to give its consent to limit 
the exercise of its powers.97
Notwithstanding its shift away from protecting state sovereignty, 
the Bekins Court articulated several guideposts that suggest when 
92 See Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936). 
93 See Bekins, 304 U.S. 27. 
94 See Jonathan J. Spitz, Federalism, States, and the Power to Regulate Municipal 
Bankruptcies: Who May Be a Debtor Under Section 109(c), 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 621, 621 (1993) 
(citing City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923); Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U.S. 
540 (1875); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4). 
95 See generally Ashton, 298 U.S. 513; Bekins, 304 U.S. 27. 
96 See Ashton, 298 U.S. at 542 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
97 See Bekins, 304 U.S. at 52. 
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municipal bankruptcy might run afoul of the Constitution.98  The key 
requirements appear to be that a city cannot be forced to file for 
bankruptcy against its will, and that a bankruptcy judge cannot usurp a 
municipality’s political decisionmaking authority.99  These standards are 
relevant for determining the constitutionality of a state-bankruptcy 
chapter because both involve the limits of federal intrusion into state 
sovereignty. 
Since the Bekins Court found that the municipal-bankruptcy law 
was sufficiently circumscribed so as not to impinge upon state 
sovereignty, a state-bankruptcy law that honors the Bekins principles 
would be equally sound.100  However, the same bankruptcy law may not 
apply identically to municipalities and states, because they represent two 
different forms of sovereignty.101  Municipalities are endowed with some 
features of sovereignty, but not all.102  In contrast, states possess all 
aspects of sovereignty that they did not give up when they ratified the 
Constitution.  Accordingly, a state-bankruptcy chapter would inherently 
risk a greater intrusion into state sovereignty than municipal bankruptcy. 
Moreover, the “necessity” rationale articulated by the Bekins Court 
does not apply to states in the same way as it does to municipalities.  The 
Bekins Court, mirroring Justice Cardozo’s dissent in Ashton, emphasized 
that without municipal bankruptcy a “[s]tate . . . is powerless to rescue” 
its municipalities from financial ruin.103  This is not the case with states 
themselves because, unlike a municipality, a state always has the option 
of defaulting on debt and refusing to pay creditors, much like a sovereign 
country.104
98 See id. at 51-52. 
99 See id. at 51. 
100 See David A. Skeel Jr., States of Bankruptcy 24 (U of Penn, Inst. for Law & Econ 
Research Paper No. 11-24) (July 30, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1907774. 
101 See Carol F. Lee, The Federal Courts and the Status of Municipalities: A Conceptual 
Challenge, 62 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1982) (“Underlying the cases is a conceptual duality that has long 
characterized legal thinking about municipal subdivisions. The city is an intermediate entity, created 
by the sovereign state, exercising power over the citizenry, yet in form and dignity not equivalent to 
the state. According to the traditional doctrine, it derives a public, governmental character from the 
state and shares some of the state’s powers and immunities.”). 
102 Id.
103 See Bekins, 304 U.S. at 54. 
104 See, e.g., Robert M. Barnett, Exchange Rate Arrangements in the International Monetary 
Fund: The Fund As Lawgiver, Adviser, and Enforcer, 7 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 77, 89-93 (1993); 
Derek W. Bowett, Claims Between States and Private Entities: The Twilight Zone of International 
Law, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 929, 931-32 (1986); Enrique R. Carrasco & Randall Thomas, 
Encouraging Relational Investment and Controlling Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries in 
the Aftermath of the Mexican Financial Crisis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 539 (1996); Rainer 
Geiger, The Unilateral Change of Economic Development Agreements, 23 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 73
(1974); Rory Macmillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 305, 353 (1995).  
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In summary, the principles expressed in Bekins will likely play a 
role in determining the constitutionality of any state-bankruptcy chapter.  
The Court contemplated the prospect of extending bankruptcy protection 
to states as it shaped the guideposts for when a municipal-bankruptcy 
chapter might violate sovereignty principles.  Even assuming, however, 
that Bekins is good law today, an analysis of the constitutionality of a 
state-bankruptcy chapter must take into account the Court’s evolving 
protection of state sovereignty. 
C.  STATE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES
While Ashton and Bekins were decided on Tenth Amendment 
grounds, it is not prudent to simply grab the decisions from the shelf and 
apply them directly to the constitutionality of a state bankruptcy.  For 
starters, the Ashton Court did not directly cite the Tenth Amendment to 
invalidate the MBA.  Nevertheless, the Court’s focus on state 
sovereignty supports such an interpretation of the Court’s reasoning.105
If a bankruptcy chapter was challenged on Tenth Amendment 
grounds,106 it is plausible that the Court would come down squarely on 
the side of state sovereignty because this issue has been a primary 
concern for a majority of the curr 107
Over the course of American history, the Court has shifted between 
two different approaches as to whether the Tenth Amendment is a 
judicially enforceable limit on Congress’s powers.108  Insofar as the 
Court in the early 1930s, as represented by the Ashton decision, was 
fixated on defining rigid boundaries between the national and state 
There is, however, a kind of “necessity” in both cases.  States today, like municipalities in the 1930s, 
are grappling with dire financial troubles. See Alison Vekshin, State Bankruptcy Weighed by 
Republicans Blocking Aid, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 21, 2011, 2:18 PM), www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
01-21/u-s-state-bankruptcy-weighed-by-house-republicans-blocking-aid.html.  States can always 
raise revenues to dig out of a financial crisis, but so can municipalities.  Although a fear exists that if 
a municipality raises taxes, its citizens will move elsewhere, the same fear exists on the state level 
that citizens may “vote with their feet” in response to tax hikes.  However, there is less justification 
for this fear on the state level; it is often more difficult to move out of the state than out of the 
municipality. 
105 See Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936). 
106 The Tenth Amendment reads, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. X.
107 See David A. Skeel Jr., States of Bankruptcy 24 (U of Penn, Inst. for Law & Econ 
Research Paper No. 11-24) (July 30, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1907774. 
108 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 312-13 (3d ed. 2006).  Scholars tend to 
identify three main policy rationales behind federalism: “decreasing the likelihood of federal 
tyranny, enhancing democratic rule by providing government that is closer to the people, and 
allowing states to be laboratories for new ideas.”  Id.
18
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governments,109 the Tenth Amendment cases from that period have lost 
some of their force, because modernly the Court has not required such a 
strict separation.110  Between 1937 and the 1990s, the Court expressly 
rejected the position that the Tenth Amendment operates as an 
independent limit on the legislative power.111  Instead, the Court has 
viewed the Tenth Amendment during this period as an unenforceable 
admonition that there must be authority in the Constitution before 
Congress can legislate.112
In the 1990s, by contrast, the Court revived the Tenth Amendment 
as a limit on congressional power in its anticommandeering cases, New 
York v. United States113 and Printz v. United States.114  In these cases, the 
109 See Ashton, 298 U.S. at 528 (“[There can] be no loss of separate and independent 
autonomy to the States, through their union under the Constitution.” (quoting Texas v. White, 74 
U.S. 700, 725 (1868))).  Some leading examples of cases discussing the concept of dual sovereignty 
are found in cases throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  See Indian Motor Cycle Co. v. 
United States, 283 U.S. 570, 575 (1931) (“[I]t is an established principle of our constitutional system 
of dual government that the instrumentalities, means and operations whereby the United States 
exercises its governmental powers are exempt from taxation by the States . . . [and t]his principle is 
implied from the independence of the national and state governments within their respective spheres 
and from the provisions of the Constitution which look to the maintenance of the dual system. . . . 
Where the principle applies it is . . . absolute.”); Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124 
(1870) (“The general government, and the States, although both exist within the same territorial 
limits, are separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, 
within their respective spheres.”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428-36 (1819) 
(describing the reciprocal immunity from taxation of the state and federal governments); New York 
v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 594 (1946) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The notion that the sovereign 
position of the States must find its protection in the will of a transient majority of Congress is foreign 
to and a negation of our constitutional system.  There will often be vital regional interests 
represented by no majority in Congress.  The Constitution was designed to keep the balance between 
the States and the nation outside the field of legislative controversy.”).  The Federalist Papers as well 
reflect dual sovereignty ideas.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 256 (James Madison) (Jacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961) (“[T]he proposed Government cannot be deemed a national one; since its 
jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary 
and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 548 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be 
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.”). 
110 See Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, the Tenth Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1871, 1873 (1976) (describing “the demise of the nineteenth century notion of dual 
sovereignty”).  This theory has been explained in John H. Clough, Federalism: The Imprecise 
Calculus of Dual Sovereignty, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (2001); Lipson, Fighting Fiction, 78 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1271 (2000); William E. Thro, That Those Limits May Not Be Forgotten: An 
Explanation of Dual Sovereignty, 12 WIDENER L.J. 567, 569 (2003) (“[The dual sovereignty] theory 
views the Constitution as dividing sovereignty between the States and the National Government, 
vesting specific powers in both sovereigns, and forbidding one sovereign from interfering with the 
other sovereign’s exercise of its powers.”). 
111 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552-53 (1985) 
(adopting the rationale that the political process is sufficient to safeguard state sovereignty). 
112 Id.
113 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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Court struck down federal legislation that required the states to address 
issues of national concern.  These cases held that Congress may not 
“commandeer” states or coerce them into carrying out federal policy.115
In New York, the Court struck down a federal law requiring state 
governments to clean up their nuclear wastes,116 as such actions 
impermissibly “commandeer[ed]” the states to enact laws.117  In Printz,
the Court held that a provision of the Brady Handgun Control Act, which 
required local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks 
prior to issuing firearm permits, was unconstitutional.118  As in New
York, the Court explained that Congress may not force states to 
implement federal policy.119  These cases have made it clear that the 
Court will use the Tenth Amendment to restrain the power of the federal 
government.120
Under an expansive reading of the Tenth Amendment, perhaps the 
Court might return to the Ashton conception of state sovereignty and 
strike down state bankruptcy on the grounds that such legislation permits 
federal judges too much authority to meddle in state affairs.121  Even 
with the recent shift toward protecting state sovereignty, the Court has 
not required a strict separation between the federal and state governments 
in the same way that it adhered to the dual sovereignty theory in the 
past.122  The Court has not held that the Tenth Amendment reserves a 
zone of activities for exclusive state control.  Instead, recent decisions 
have made it clear that Congress cannot compel state legislative or 
114 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).  One scholar argues that the new federalism 
that emerged in the 1990s is a different form, the “etiquette of federalism.”  Alfred R. Light, Lifting
Printz Off Dual Sovereignty: Back to a Functional Test for the Etiquette of Federalism, 13 BYU J.
PUB. L. 49, 49 (1998) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
115 See Samuel L. Bufford & Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Problems in the 2005 
Bankruptcy Amendments, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 24 (2008). 
116 New York, 505 U.S. at 149. 
117 Id. at 175. 
118 Printz, 521 U.S. at 902. 
119 Id. at 935. 
120 See Katherine A. Connolly, Who’s Left Standing for State Sovereignty, Private Party 
Standing to Raise Tenth Amendment Claims, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1539, 1541 (2010). 
121 However, this result may be unlikely, considering that the federal government is already 
deeply involved in state affairs in other areas, such as Medicaid funding obligations, tax policy, and 
welfare restrictions.  See David A. Skeel Jr., States of Bankruptcy 24-25 (U of Penn, Inst. for Law & 
Econ Research Paper No. 11-24) (July 30, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1907774. 
122 See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1962 (2010); Edward S. Corwin, 
The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).  However, some scholars have argued 
that “the concept of a state sovereignty constitutionally immune from excessive federal impairment 
has never been wholly abandoned where regulation affects the operations of the state itself rather 
than merely displacing its authority to regulate private conduct.”  See Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, 
the Tenth Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1871, 1873 (1976). 
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regulatory activity.123  This distinction, as far as it goes, would seem to 
permit bankruptcy legislation so long as it is entirely voluntary and the 
states retain authority to manage their own legislative af
Moreover, the prospects for upholding a state-bankruptcy chapter 
also benefit from the wide berth given to Congress’s exercise of power 
under the Bankruptcy Clause.  The Court has seldom stricken down 
bankruptcy legislation on other constitutional grounds.124  In the single 
case125 in which the Court struck down bankruptcy legislation on Tenth 
Amendment grounds, its reasoning was based in concerns over 
protecting state sovereignty, the very same rationale used to strike down 
laws exceeding the scope of the Commerce Clause.  Indeed, Professor 
Lipson argues that “[i]n the case of vertical relations, bankruptcy appears 
to be an exception to the Rehnquist Court’s robust protection for states 
from federal judicial power.”126  Since it is a distinct constitutional 
clause, it therefore would be reasonable for the Court to apply the Tenth 
Amendment dissimilarly to the bankruptcy power.  The animating theme 
of constitutional interpretation of the Bankruptcy Clause is “bankruptcy 
exceptionalism”: courts often treat the bankruptcy power differently than 
other clauses.127  For example, in another bankruptcy context, the Court 
has held that the Bankruptcy Clause trumps state sovereignty 
128
123 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992); Printz, 521 U.S. at 902.  
Specifically, those decisions held that Congress may not “commandeer” states or coerce them into 
implementing federal policy. 
124 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982) (Article 
III); Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 532 (1936) 
(encroachment on state sovereignty); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 
601-02 (1935) (Takings Clause). 
125 See Ashton, 298 U.S. at 530.
126 See Lipson, Debt and Democracy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 637-38 (2008).  
Specifically, in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, the Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that a 
state’s sovereign immunity does not apply to a suit in bankruptcy court to avoid a preferential 
transfer received by the state.  546 U.S. 356, 373-78 (2006).  Sovereign immunity is embodied in the 
Eleventh Amendment, which precludes suits “in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against 
one of the United States by Citizens of another State.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XI.  Professor Lipson 
argues that a reasonable inference would be that Katz could form the basis for a bankruptcy power 
unchecked by the First, Fifth, or any other Amendments.  See Lipson, Debt and Democracy, 83 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. at 643. This decision carved out a special exception to the states’ sovereign 
immunity for bankruptcy matters, and “strongly smacks of exceptionalism.”  Id. at 644. 
127 See Lipson, Debt and Democracy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. at 611. 
128 See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll., 546 U.S. at 378. 
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II.  “TOO BIG TO FAIL” AND OTHER POLICY REASONS FOR STATE 
BANKRUPTCY
Much like the last major expansion of the bankruptcy statutes to 
municipalities, spurred by the financial troubles of the Great Depression, 
so too has the recent Great Recession spurred the need for another 
expansion of the Bankruptcy Code.  Creating a new state-bankruptcy 
chapter could be the next stage in the bankruptcy evolution.  Once 
thought of as a far-fetched idea, the creation of a state-bankruptcy 
chapter is now taken seriously by both policymakers129 and legal 
scholars.130  The growing desire to avoid another round of massive 
federal bailouts has made bankruptcy for states more attractive. 
In 2007, the bank bailouts were seen as necessary to avert a 
financial crisis.  The Bush Administration argued that if a large financial 
institution defaulted, then creditors would lead a panicked “run” on the 
banks.  Since banks are so interconnected with one another, a failure of 
one could lead to a failure of all, creating an immediate financial 
crisis.131  It soon came to pass that people, who were struggling 
themselves during hard economic times and cutting back on their 
personal budgets, viewed these bailouts with disgust. 
The prospect of bailing out big-spending states, such as California 
and Illinois, is nearly as hated as the decision to bail out the banks.  In 
response to a question addressing the possibility of providing federal 
assistance to insolvent states, the Senate Republican Minority Leader 
declared, “There will be no bailouts, I can tell you that. No bailouts.”132
It is questionable, however, whether Congress could resist the mounting 
political pressure to do nothing if bailing out an insolvent state was 
necessary to avert a financial meltdown.  This is the problem of 
institutions that are deemed “too big to fail.”  If a default by a large 
financial institution is guaranteed to bring down the economy, it is 
reasonable to bail out the institution.  This kind of market contagion took 
place in the recent financial crisis, when the loss of investor confidence 
129 See, e.g., Jeb Bush & Newt Gingrich, Op-Ed., Better Off Bankrupt, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 
2011, http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/jan/27/opinion/la-oe-gingrich-bankruptcy-20110127. 
130 See David A. Skeel Jr., States of Bankruptcy 24 (U of Penn, Inst. for Law & Econ 
Research Paper No. 11-24) (July 30, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1907774. 
131 Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy”, 59 UCLA L. REV.
322, 325 (2011). 
132 See Andy Sullivan & Lisa Lambert, Senate Leaders Eye Option of State Bankruptcy,
REUTERS, Jan. 25, 2011, www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/25/us-usa-states-bankruptcy-senate-
idUSTRE70O66220110125. 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss2/4
2012] State Bankruptcy 239 
 markets.
                                                          
in the market for mortgage-backed securities set off a loss of confidence 
in the broader market for all rated debt securities.133
The same grim logic appears to apply to states.  Several states are 
teetering on the edge of insolvency.134  Financially strapped states have 
responded to multi-billion-dollar budget deficits by turning to austerity 
measures, tax increases, and renegotiation of union contracts.135  A 
growing consensus has emerged that states will need debt relief.136
Some form of debt relief will be needed if a state’s debt burden 
becomes so overwhelming that reasonable efforts to reform the state’s 
fiscal affairs are doomed to fail.  In this situation, a federal bailout 
becomes necessary to avoid default.137  Some scholars have suggested 
that certain states are “too big to fail” based on the high degree of 
interconnectedness with the economy.138  The fear is that a state default 
would trigger a market contagion with systemic consequences.139  Such a 
contagion could occur if the loss of investor confidence with one 
indebted state undermines such confidence in the debt of all states with 
shaky balance sheets, leading to a collapse of the broader market.140
This collapse in one market may undermine confidence in related 
markets, say for corporate bonds 141
Creating an orderly mechanism for providing debt relief to states 
would “reduce the inevitable political pressure on the federal government 
to bail out defaulting states.”142  Although congressional leaders contend 
that no bailouts will occur on their watch, it is doubtful that they would 
133 See Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy”, 59 UCLA L. REV. at 324-
25. 
134 See Alison Vekshin, State Bankruptcy Weighed by Republicans Blocking Aid,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 21, 2011), www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-21/u-s-state-bankruptcy-
weighed-by-house-republicans-blocking-aid.html. 
135 See, e.g., NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N & NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, THE
FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES 8 (Fall 2010) (“In fiscal 2010, the actions taken most consistently were 
targeted cuts [in the state workforce], which were put in place by 33 states, as well as across the 
board cuts, which were utilized by 26 states . . . . To eliminate fiscal 2011 budget gaps, 35 states are 
using specific, targeted cuts [in the state workforce], while 25 states have employed across the board 
cuts.  Another method being used by 19 states is to reduce aid to localities while 13 states made use 
of their rainy day funds.”). 
136 See Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy”, 59 UCLA L. REV. at 324 
(citing State and Municipal Debt: The Coming Crisis?: Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Servs., and 
Bailouts of Pub. & Private Programs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 
(2011) (opening statement of Rep. Patrick Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform) 
(observing that the “vast majority of states now find themselves in a fiscal straightjacket”)). 
137 See id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
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refuse if economists advise that a state bailout is necessary to avert a 
financial meltdown.  It is one thing to publicly oppose the idea of 
bailouts in the abstract.  It is quite another, however, to sit by when 
headlines are declaring that a state’s impending default will send the 
whole country into another Great Depression.  On the other hand, the 
debate over raising the debt ceiling demonstrated that congressional 
leaders are quite willing to engage in a high-stakes game of chicken.  
These leaders may have a point; “[i]f a federal bailout were to occur, the 
resulting moral hazard . . . and too-big-to-fail dilemma would likely 
dwarf that of financial institutions, which are at least somewhat 
disciplined by the threat of being liquidated.”143
Some scholars have argued that the “too big to fail” problem does 
not apply to states.144  They argue that bondholders are the states’ most 
important creditors, and they cannot pull their funding in the same way 
that a bank’s short-term creditors can.145  On the other hand, it is 
reasonable to fear that a host of state bond defaults would destabilize the 
financial markets.  State and municipal debt is widely interconnected 
with the banks, as banks own more than $229 billion in state and 
municipal bonds.146
Likewise, a state’s default on its debts threatens more than its own 
ability to borrow at low interest rates; it threatens the banks as well, 
which hold large amounts of state municipal bonds.  Therefore, a state 
default could mean that banks will suffer huge losses.147  Additionally, 
there is further potential for a financial crisis, because municipal debt is 
viewed as a “safe” investment.148  A municipal bond crisis would 
endanger one of the few “safe” investments available, and this is 
particularly troublesome given the fragile state of the economy.149
143 Id.
144 See David A. Skeel Jr., States of Bankruptcy 24 (U of Penn, Inst. for Law & Econ 
Research Paper No. 11-24) (July 30, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1907774. 
145 Id.  Moreover, the bond market is already starting to discount the possibility of a default by 
California. Id.
146 See James Pethokoukis, When States Go Bust, WEEKLY STANDARD (Feb. 14, 2011), 
www.weeklystandard.com/articles/when-states-go-bust_541424.html. 
147 Id.
148 See David A. Skeel Jr., States of Bankruptcy 4 (U of Penn, Inst. for Law & Econ Research 
Paper No. 11-24) (July 30, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1907774.
149 See Nicole Gelinas, The Market Won’t Fix States’ Woes, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 23, 2011, 
www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2011/01/23/the_market_wont_fix_stat
es_woes/.
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III.  IMPACT OF TENTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS ON DRAFTING 
CONSIDERATIONS
The federal municipal-bankruptcy regulations are drafted in a way 
that is sensitive to federalism concerns.150  These regulations walk a 
tightrope between the congressional power to establish uniform 
bankruptcy regulations and the state power reserved under the Tenth 
Amendment.151  Such federalism concerns are manifested in a number of 
ways.  First, section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a 
municipality can file for Chapter Nine relief only if it is “generally 
authorized to be a debtor . . . by State law.”152  Second, only a voluntary 
debtor may initiate Chapter Nine proceedings.  Involuntary petitions are 
not allowed, to avoid infringements of state sovereignty.153  Third, the 
bankruptcy judge’s role in the Chapter Nine process is very limited.154
The bankruptcy court’s role is generally limited to overseeing the 
implementation of the plan, as opposed to interfering with the entity’s 
property or revenues.155
Upon closer inspection, however, it is unclear whether the 
Constitution requires these restrictions, much less whether they reflect 
good bankruptcy policy.  Determining the scope of the bankruptcy power 
has taken on new urgency in the debate over creating a state-bankruptcy 
chapter, because such restrictions may hamper the effectiveness of a new 
bankruptcy regime.  To the extent that federalism concerns restrict the 
breadth of relief that can be offered to states, such a chapter would 
become less effective. 
The question becomes whether the drafting choices that would be 
required to avoid constitutional problems would reduce the effectiveness 
of a state-bankruptcy chapter.  Leading scholars have suggested that a 
state-bankruptcy chapter must provide for the bankruptcy court to have 
limited powers.156  Otherwise it risks running afoul of federalism norms 
enshrined in the Constitution.  However, narrowly drafting the state-
150 See Jonathan J. Spitz, Federalism, States, and the Power to Regulate Municipal 
Bankruptcies: Who May Be a Debtor Under Section 109(c), 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 621 (1993). 
151 Id. at 629-30. 
152 Id. at 627 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (1988)).  Moreover, Congress’s federalism 
concerns are further illustrated by § 943(b)(6), which provides that the municipal debtor must obtain 
for its reorganization plan “any regulatory or electoral approval necessary under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law in order to carry out any provision of the plan.”  Id. at 632. 
153 Id. at 626. 
154 Id.
155 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 904 (1988)). 
156 See David A. Skeel Jr., State Bankruptcy from the Ground Up 20 (Univ. of Penn. Research 
Paper No. 382 (2011), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn_wps/382. 
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bankruptcy chapter might drain the chapter of all its potential benefits.  If 
the Constitution places few constraints on the powers of a bankruptcy 
court, is a state-bankruptcy chapter still worthwhile?  These are the 
questions that policymakers must face as they decide how to implement a 
state-bankruptcy chapter.
CONCLUSION
The leading proponents of a state-bankruptcy chapter have tended to 
assume that bankruptcy for states would be easily constitutional, while at 
the same time expressing concerns that such a chapter could 
unconstitutionally infringe state sovereignty.  While the sovereignty 
issues involved with municipal bankruptcy are not identical to those with 
state bankruptcy, as long as the principles handed down by the Bekins
court are honored, a federal law that extends bankruptcy protection to 
states should pass constitutional muster.  However, whether the Bekins
decision is still good law is up for debate, given the resurgence of the 
Tenth Amendment in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.  In the event 
that the Tenth Amendment constrains the drafting choices of 
policymakers, the effectiveness of the resulting state-bankruptcy chapter 
may be diminished.  Nonetheless, the normative strengths and practical 
benefits of a state-bankruptcy chapter argue in favor of moving forward 
to the next stage in the bankruptcy evolution. 
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